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I

llULTINATIONAL cor,POU.ATIOH~ AND n:::IBNDENT UNDEPJ)E\IELOPl-lCHT
IN l-1nm:r,A1-:::POTI.T ZCONOMIES: l
?

Norman Girvan-

The purpose of this paper ic to cctablish a framework for the analysis of
the anatomy of dependent underdeve lopment for economics which arc structure d
around mincral-c ::port industrie s operated by large multinati onal firms.
Hinterlan d

3

In

America, the cconor:d.cs of Venezuela , Chile, Surinam, Guyana,· Jamaica,

Trinidad-T obaco and the Dutch Antilles all fall into thiD catcr;ory to a greater
t-

or lesser decree'.

The minera 1-e::port induDtry in these countries provides the

bulk, or a large part, of foreicn c::chancc receipts and Governmen t revenue;
the imports and Govc.:nmcn t c::pcnditu: .:e thus financed arc critical to the main
tenance and crowth of economic activity.

The persisten t structura l dependenc e

of these countrieG remain::; a problco :for policy-ma l~crs and analy::;ts alike.

5

The hidden and open con£ licts between their Governmen ts and the producing
companies civc rise to a state of virtually chronic crisis in this area of
internati onal economic relationD .
Hy ba::;ic propositi on is that the functioni ng of thcoe industl."'ic s in the

national economic::. in which they a.:e r,hysicall y located can be better. understoo d
by an analyoio of their functionin r; in the corpol."'atc economics of which they are

an organic pa.:t.

Such problems ao thci::: dependenc e on fo::-cicn dcoand, prices

and decioion-r aal:inr;; the larce amount:. of profit repatriat ion and its reflectio n,
116
1
to the national economy;
the low share of the industry' o value uhich is 'r:.cturned
and the lac!~ of intcc:rati on of the industry with the nations l economy; arc the
surface manifesta tions of the institutio nalized relations hips between
~J:bsidia rics and their parent firms.·.. Analysis of the tradition al national indc2:ea

- 2 of economic dependence, though useful, has been limited in its value by a neglect
of the doing part of these industries.

Uhcrc the effects of company policies

arc treated, they arc introduced in c::n ad hoc, unsystematic manner, almost as if
they arc accidental and random int::usions into the economic picture.

In what

followo I try to develop the idea tlrnt any analysis of the e:"tcrnal relationships of
these industries should be based on an analysis of the organic relationship between tl-c
subsidia::y and th~ parent company in contcopp:ra::-y vcrtically-inter;:rntcd r.mltinational
firms.
The pursuit of this idcn led to the need for the development of the notion

of a corpo::atc economic system as a system conceptually qui tc distinct from a
national ccononic system; althoui:;h obviou::.ly the two do ovc:i:lap in the real

world,

For e:~anple, a prope:i: undc::::.tandinr; of the behaviour of Chile Copper

Company hus to be based on an analysis of the r;lobal corpo::ate economy of Anaconda,
the parent coopany.

This leads in turn to subject matter iJhich has traditionally

been the c::clusivc preserve of Ilusines::; :-:conomics.

It bccane clca::, to this

writer at any rate, that the traditionally strict divorce bctlvccn "true"

Economics and Dusincss ::conomics i::; obaolete, if ever the:.·c was a justification
for it.

To ::ccownizc this,· one ncccl only consider that the

11

national II economics

of many Hinterland countries arc the ::esulw nc::cly of the activities of the
susbidiarics of two or three multinational firms within thci:i: national borders.
The ideas uhich follow arc based on continuinr; empirical ::escarch on the
corporate ccononic::; of the

alur.1iniu □,

pctrolcura and copper fiJ:ms which c::tract

their raw oatcrials from Hinterland Ame:dca; and on the national economics of
thonc countries in llintcrland Ancrica \Jhich a::c structurally dependent on the

export of these ::aw or

sc □ i-ptoccsscd □ incral

producta by these

co □ panics.

Specifically, mo::;t of the idcai:; a::c based on the followin:3 companies and countries:

the Aluminu.r.i ~oopany of Ar.i.c.:-ica, Alcan Alur:rl.nil.li:i'l Ltd, ,Standard Oil of New Jersey,
Royal Dutch-Shell, Anaconda Hini~ ::!or:,pany, and Kcnnccot ..::op::,er Corporation;
Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Venezuela and c:iilc.
is historical analyais.

7

The rnethodolor;y of the research

The ::aw material is the natural consec:uence of this:

Annual r..eporta of the cor:ipanies, co:::porate hi.stories and articles on the companies;

economic histories and conterJporary cconor:iic analysi:::. of the countries.

It

should be stressed that the intention '.1c:::c is to 3ivc only aomc baoic principles
which seer:t to be ar,plicable to the ::;cnc.:al case of multinational corporations
and mineral-c::po,:t cconor:iics.
The nain qucotions for uhich we ace:: an an::.wc::.- arc (1) llo,;1 did these
firms coae to dominate the oinera 1-export industric::. of llinte::land Ar:lcrica?
(2) llow docs thi:::. pattern of econonic o::::;anization affect the clcte::r.1ination of
the level of output in the minc,:al-c::po.:tinr; country? (3) Ilo,;1 doc::. the. pattern
of economic orr;anization affect the level of national incor.ic, the ::ate of economic
development and the der;rce of c:rtc::nal dependence of the

□incral-e::port

cconocy?

and (l;) Hhy is it that Government :-trater;ies of ta::in3 the raincral-c::port industry
heavily and usinr; tlle revenue to p~·ooote economic dcvclopracnt ocet ,;vi.th limited
success?
The analysical framework within which these 1ucstion::: can l>e profitably
discussed unfolds itself in staccq ~~ich.ars partly chronolozical
and partly conccptu.:11.

They arc (i) c:ian::;e::. in metropolitan tcchnolo::;y and der.1and

which created ne,;i indu:::trie::. in t:1c iietropolc:::; (ii) C:han::;es in r.1etropo,l:itan

economic orcani~a::ion uhich ::;ave :·ise ::o the c:-.1c::cence of vc::tically-intcr;ratcd,
oligopoli::.tic

fi.: □s

in these indu:::t::ie::;; (iii) The r.tultinationalization of the

typical firrl; ,·.•: (iv) The procc:-::. of ::;::outh and development of the typical firm
over time and (v) T'.1e -::-olc of the :::.ub:::idia:::y in the vertically intc:3::atcd firr.t.

This pape:: ic therefore divided into t\vO parts.

Part 1 diocusses the

multinational corpo::ation and the r:1ine;:al-e~:port industry, and Pa::t 2 diocusses
the Hinterland economy and the mine::al-e::port industry.

I

,.,
The Multinational Corporationu
(i) Changes In iletropolitan Teclmolo:w and Demand
Theemercence of petroleum, copper an<l alumin:iln as large-scale, basic

industriec was
industries.

□ar::ed

by a number of cllaracteristicc common to all three

First, they all cmcrecd in tbe latte:r part of the nineteenth

century in the liet::opoles, particularly in the United States.

Before this

time oil and copr,er industries did e::ict in n nuraber of countriec.

But the

level of production uas -::-elatively low, p::icea \vere :relatively hi3h, the individual
producing unit i1a::: :::-elatively small and based on easily-wor::ed deposits:

surface

seepages of oil and high-grade coppe::- o::cs.
Hhat too:: place in the i'.Ietropolec betueen 1350 and 19C·J was a technological

revolution in production which created supplies which were not only quantitatively
greater but r,ualitatively different.

Subterranean oil ·was brought to the surface,

refined and transpo::ted lone; distance::: by the discovery of oil uell drilling
and the induced chanc;ec in the tec!mology of refining and trancpo-::-t Ores which
contained co little copper that they ue::.·e once considered worthle::;c were brou3ht

into production by change::: in the tccbnolocy of mining and refining; .t\luoinium
metal began to be p::oduced in coru.1ercial c:;uantiticc for the first time.
The chance::: on the supply cidc i1ere in pa-;:-t the cauce and in part the
effect of cha~ec on the der.mnd aide, in ubich technolor;y alGo played an
important part.

In oil and aluminiur.1, it wa:::; the breal:throuchc in the technology

-

of produ ction in the 1G50

'5

'.j -

nr,""-t, ,
repec tivel y which r;tinu lated new uses and
and l uu..,
tJ

grow th of deraan d for wire
the searc h fo:r ncv raark ctn; in coppc ::, the rapid
ty indu:: ::try in the lOO'J
resu ltinc from the eneq~ cncc of the elec trici

1

5

induc ed

a large r;eale . Subc equen tly,
the drive to nine and treat low-r ;rade orec on
ly cide inter acted upon one anoth er
techn ical chanc e on both the deman d and t'.1e :rnpp
with cumu b1tiv e effoc ts.

1900s
Thus, the autom obile :;:evo lution in the early

ctr; of all three indur ;tries , and
creat ed e::plo r;ive 3ro,-1 th dcmandr; for the produ
nupp ly 5ide.
this induc ed furtb e:r techn ical chan3 es on the
Oligo polir ;tic Fi:..·n
(ii) The Er.ic:: ~cnce of The Vert icall y-Int cr;ra tcd.
econo nic o::r;a nizat ion
Accor .ipany in3 thene chang es ,ms a .:evo lutio n in

which wa::; no less 5ir;n ifica nt.

Ily tl1c early 19.JO::; the larr;c numbe:..· of sraal l,

coppe r indur; t::ie:: ; had been displ aced
singl e-sta ~e, local Iirr.u:: in the pet::o leur.1 and
ed firm::; natio nal in scope and
by a ::;mal l numbe:: of large , vc.:ti cnlly -inte ::;rat
with olj_i ;opol istic r.1arl:et contr ol.

In aluni n iur:i.,monopo1y of r.1eta 1 produ ction was

se of the Pitt::i bu::-r; h r..edu ction
a featu re of t!1c indu: :;try from the out::; et becau
Company 'i:;

9

ny soon Get about
acqu i::.iti on of the paten t ri2)1t ::., and the compa

e:~tr actio n and forwa rds into
inte grat i~ itr;e lf bac!~ lJards into nm r.mte rial
fabri catio n.
oli::; opoli r;tic firn ,~as an
It appea rs tb.at the encr:: ;ence of the integ rated
.'.'evo lution which tool: place in
inher ent and po::;r ;ibly indi:: :pens ablc part of the
of techn olocy , and in the
the ::;cal c oi produ ction and der.1and, in the level
quan tity of carit al utili zed in produ ction .

Hith much norc capi tal comr: iitted

to r.1inimi:::e the rir;::r; of invco tmen t
to produ ction on a r:i.uch la:.:::;er ccale , firr:w had
opera tion by acqu irinc their
and as!:lu re their focil itiec of :foll- cnpa city
own ra,-1 r:iate ::ial ::.upp lie::; and

□arl:et

outlet .c.:.

All ntace s of produ ~tion and

,-1ith in the front ier::. of corpo rate
mar:: etin2 had to.be brour; b.t a::; fa::- a::; por;n ibic
becau nc of strat er;ic contr ol of one
contr ol. Tho5c fi;:r.1::; l1hich ::;ot a hcad.c .:tn::t,

- Gstage of the incluct;:y or the technology of rroduction, or because of entrepreneurial
foresight and initiative, or becauoe of a combination of all three, were able to
absorb in one uay or a not he:..· the wea::e::: and r.iore vulnerable f irr.i::;.
continued until

D

This process

or:iall number of lar:::;e firms faced each other, each with its

own supplieo ~f :rau oaterial::; and ito o,m r.1ar::et outlets.

At that point in

some cases notably copper-they discovered that their competitive otrum~les
could be profitably diluted l1ith colluoive r,mr!:et control, i.e. cartel arran3ements to maintain pl'.'ice::; and profit::; by :rcotraining output.

Hh.:it usually set the

limit on the entry of ne,-1 firmo or provided the opportunities for ne,1 entrants
was the zcai:city or availability of the natural resource::; indiopenzable for

prof itablc production.

Thus, the cl i::;covery of ne,1 copper depoci ts in Hontana

in the lOOJs provided the basic fo:;:- the ncu Anaconda company to bre.:11: the control
of the Lal:e Hichican producin:::; pool; the discovery of the Te::ao oilfield::; at the
turn of the century nade it poszible for the Tc::as Co. and Gulf Oil to challenge
the

he:::;e □ony

of StandDrd Oil.

and hydroelectric rcsources

11

In contraot, Alcoa'::; control of bau::itc

10

deposits

helped to effectively prevent the entry of new

companiez to the United Stateo industi:y until after Horld Ha;: II, ,-,hen Jamaican
deposits becan to be used by r,cynolclc and I:aiser.
Another inportant factor uncle::-lyinr; the change in the nature and ccope of
economic o:r:::;anization wao the cr.icr:::;ence of national r.iar:~ctc in the Hct:ropolcc

to displace the cnall, unintecrated local r.im:-::ets Hhich had p:·cviously c;~istcd.
In lar~c part thin ua::; due to the revolution in trano port - cc pccially the
emergence of the :;.-ailuay - in the con::e::t o:2 ::-apidly :::;rouin::; u:::ban incomes.
channcs

□cant

Thc::ie

tllat the typical firn had to attain national cize - in the case of

the United :::tatec, continental size - in orde::- to coopetc.

Itc r.1a;:l:ctin3 outlets

- 7 had to be c:.tabli::::hed accordingly.

For a ::::ir:ri.lar rea:.on, it had to :::eel~ out

and acquire l'1ithin the lietropole a::: nuci1 of t::e re:.erve:::: of the nm r.mtcrial
and ancilla:::-y ;:ecource::; needed to produce it, a::; pos::;ible.

This ,,,a::; and is

neces:.ary not only to enoure ;onc-:t:£.::..~;.1 supplie:::: fo:r iUi rcf:ine::ieo
and fabricator::::, but also and no le::;::; ir.1portant, to reduce t~1e actual and
potential availability of theoe :::;upplieo to its corapetitors.Thi:::; civcs rise to
the frequently ob:::;erved phenomenon of firo::; which acquire and ~1old raw material
reserve::; far in e::ce:::s of their P'.:::::1pective need::; for decade::: to come.
(iii) The 11ultinationalization of T11e Typical Firra
The proceo:::; by which the typical

fir□

establi::;hed raarl~etinc outlets and

raw mate:::-ial facilties in foreicn count:::ies ua:::; a lo::;ical e::teni;ion of the
procei;s by which it became verticnlly inte:::;:..·ated in structure and national in
::;cope.

A::; the r.m::-:~ct became international, the firr.1:::: cane into coopctition

with firo.::; fron other llctropoles uhich had al:::;o undergone the p:·occ:::;:::; of
national vertical integration.

liet:ropolitan firr.10 therefore began to compete

with each other on each other':::; own hor.1e ground, a::; well a::: for the

□arl:ets

and the rau r.1aterials of the Ilinterlnnd count:de:::;.
Ilcnce r.mr::cting sub::::idiaries nnd then refineries ucre set up by the American
oil companieo in l:urope, and vice veroa, after t11e :.?irot Horld Uar.

A French

firm tried (and failed) to penctrnte Alcoa'::; preoerve - the U.S. r:mrl:et - in the
occond decade of tl1e century; oub::::equently the Ar:ierican fi::o in turn .:-cached
out to acquire hdyro-power site::; and aiur:iini=.1 cmcltin3 facilties in France and
Norway:

it had already cecured a la:::::;e :::lice of Canada'::; :1ydro-p0Her potential.

On the raw r:iate:ria 1 cide, the Ar:1.e::icnn col_)per coopanics had by 19~-J ::::ecured
control of all the iral_)ortnnt coppe::- ::e::::c;:ve:::: of Chile and Hc::ico.

Conr;olc:.e

and Zambian copper :1ad - naturally - been incorporated into tl1e productive apparatuo
of ;:;:nglis!i an<l ::uropean companie::::.

Alcoa

1

:::;

con:::rol of the impo::tant bau::itc dcpo::::ito

u"

of Suri.nan and Guyana waa also cor..1plete by 192C.

Araerican and Anclo-Dutch

fi.rma fou::;llt spiritedly for He1~ican oil at the turn of the nineteenth century;
in the 192::)s the battlecround shifted to Venezuela and the Hi.ddle =:aat.
t

By the 192Js nt the lntest, the present-day pattern of oultinati.onal··oorporatc

o,;mers!1ip of :::1ese ·::h:-cc oi.ne::-al-resou::ce i.nduatri.es in the Aneri.can Hiriterla-nd
had been set,

Chi.le 1 s copper was ver::i.cally integrated with the facilities of

Anaconda and I~ennecot, Sud.nan's and Guyana 'a bauxite ,-1ith the facilities of
:;he Alcoa-Aluni.niuu Ltd. eoaplen nost of Venezuela 1 s oil forc.1ed part of the
oultinati.onal o:r~ani::ations of Jerccy Standard, Shell, Gulf ancl Te::aco,
Subsequently, Ja::iaica 'a bauxite ua: cecu::-ed to the nceda of Alean Aluaini.u□ Ltd.,
Reynold::; Hetalc ancl I~aiser Alu::tlnur:i.
(iv) The P:::ocessec of G:!.·owth, Deve lopr,1cnt and r..eaource Allocation For the Fi.rm.
It coes uit!1out aayinc that the cor.1ple:: and fascinatinc procecs of the
firm's continued ::;::..-outh nnd developr..1ent involves all the dir.1ensionc of activity
already outlined; i.e. the continued d:.:ive for ncu raar:~ets and new raw r:iatcrial:

rcaerves, the continued roundinc out, and c:;~tension, of ita intccrated structure.
The inatitutionalization of r.esearch and Developr.tcnt for thcreduction of costs
and for product innovation ia of courae an inportant part of this p:.·occsc.
What is of particular importance to the p::.-csent analysis arc tuo aa pect:::; of
the firo 's cro,-1th process:

(a) hou it allocates itc needed rau r.1atcrial

production bctuccn different um matcl."ial- producinr; sub:::idiariec; (b) how it
allocates ita production, financial and research -:.-enources betlJccn cliffcrcnt
end-product::;.

Doth process ca, c1s I shall cubacquently elaborate, have an

important effect on the determination of the level of output in the nineralc:~port induct:.-y of the Hinterland countries in the ct1ort, r.1ediun ancl lone run.

-
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Ci) r.aw lJa terialn
Intuitively, it can be

asi.u□cd

that the first factor ta!:en into account

in detcrr:tl ning the dii.tribution of production between raw material oubsidiarics

is the structure o:[ relative cost::: (includinc ta::cs) in the different oubsidiaries.
Other thin[;S bcini equal, we would im::i::;ine that the cor.ipany would allocate its
raw mate:;:inl production :::o that the nun total of ;'tax-paid,: cont::: of all
suboidiarics reprcbents the leaot cootly way of obtainin3 the sur:i total of the
raw material:; it necdn to oupport itn end-product output.

Other thines, of

course, arc uoually ggec;.ual, i.o r.iucb :::o that one has to ta:~c e::plicit account of

other factori. in an abstract analy:::i::: i[ t-1e a:;.·e to hope to understand the
actual raw oatcrial policies of t~1e f

i:r □:::;.

The r.io::it inr,ortant c:ualification to the "leant-cost :i

rule a:::ises out of

certain factoi:n which place a ponitivc value on the firr:i '::: naintaining
wide gco•political npread of l."a\,;r r.u::iterial nuppliei..
arise out of the actions of national Governments.

ti

fairly

Usually the:::e :fuctors
Some oupply nourcen arc

eiven pref crentia 1 acce::;s to ::;omc r:ia::l~etn bccau:::c of neo-r:icrcpntili::it polid.e:i
(c.r;. Ame~-ican oil on the American r.1a::::et).

In r:ioi:;t countrien the :H:.:ms mu::it

develop and maintain nor:ie acceptable level of production of the :::coourcc an
a condition of sccurin:::; and l:eepin::; rcsou::ce conceirnion:::.

And there are differences,

frequently wide difrcrcnccs, bet·wecn the degree of political risks in diffcreot coun·
tries.
the ope::ation of the lea:.t
cl-~~-.:oy,
not
do
but
limit,
, :3uch facto:;.·::;
co:.t principle.

A ctanda::-d pattern appea:.:::: to be for the firr.1s to maintain a

certain eco-political sp:rcad of nm oate::ial production, and to allocate over
tirac the bul!: o:E incrcncntal production in one or a i:;rnall nur.ibc:: of pa=ticula:::
low-cost aourcc::i ac itc rau nate::ial ncecl::; ~l."OW.

At the sar.1e time, the firmc

arc constantly ncc!:in~ ncu sourccc of l'au r:iatcl:'ialo in o:.:dc:::- to 't-1idcn thei::
options, reduce thei;: conpetitor::;' option::;, and displace depleted oou:rces.

- 10 The logic of thi::: ic that the firo

1

::;

plannin3 muct include the planned displacement

of any c::ictinr; cou::ce of ::;upply7 includinr; (and for some rea:::on::: especially)
each one located in each Hinterland count:::-y.
The planned dicplaceraent of each cource operate::; both on the level of
the fire's actual intention::; and on the level of itc contin3ency planninc. Any
given sou::ce rJay be abruptly lo::;t to the

fi:::- □

because of a chance in Government

_policy, c::propriation, war or such other act::; of men which the fi::n r.ii[;ht well
put in the ::;ar.1e category ac Actr. of God.

Thuc, there mi.mt be a contingency plan

fo::: such unforeseen dcvelopoents. nut: for tllcse particular :::ource::: ,-,here the

rate of e::traction is relatively hi::;h becau:::c incrcraental production is beinz
located there, the fi:::o oust actively plan for that aorc or les::: foreseeable
point in the future when it uill locate incremental procluction at come other
oource or :::ct of :::ou::ccs.

The most iopo:rtant prcs:::urcs r;ivinr; :rise to thio

arc the depletion of hir;h-crade o:: eD:::ily-c::tractcd ::-eservc::: of the natural
resource ancl the as:::ociatcd ::;rowtll in e:;traction co:::t:::; and the r;rowth of the
ta:: rate and pe::.-hap::: of otnte intervention as the Ilinterland Govcr-nment strum~lcs

for a 3rowinr; cha:::-e of the lar:;e ourplunes realized by the induotry.
The !1ictory of the oil ccr.Jyu.icc ~Jroviclcc the mo:::t :::i1arply defined c.:ises
of plannccl tli:::placement of supply con:rces.

Ara1erican oil conpanic::: :::hiftcd

increocntal production f::.."Ora the United State::; tc, Hcxico in the ea::ly twentieth
century, froo i:Ie::ico to Venezuela betucen the 19200 and 19l:-O:::, from Venezuela
to the Hiddle :a:::t in the 1950c nnd 19GJc
to Africa
.
, c1nd will shift progressively
.
end Alaska in the 1970s..

ai.1alogous ·ways.

~;~c the coprs:c 2nd alumin:··n. firms also behaved in

Anacond8 an,:l I(enn'3cot lac~ tee: incremental output in Chile from

tl1e !.920s to the 1940s, and tb:::T.1. i:;:,..:.:~~:-d heck to United St.ates sources when

they got into trouble with ·i.:he Chilean Gcvernment,

- 11 -

ir bau xite
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In the oil industry, the shiftc have been to jointly-pr oduced commodit ies.
First, the companiea :::hifted incremen tally from l::eroscnc to r;asoline in the early
part of the century ai:. electric lir;htinc displaced the l::eroscne lamp and as the
automobil e revolutio n created an e::plosive ly growing r;as mar!~et; then since 1950
they have shifted incremen tally into pctrochem icala as the rate of r;rowth of
demand for ::;asolcne levelled off in the United State::; and the demand for
petrochem icalG ha::; crown rapidly.
to a competinr: comodity :

In the copper industry, the ::;hift has been

Anaconda, r.evcre Copper and Kennecot all acquired

stal::es in the alur:iinium industry in the post-Seco nd World Uar period, as this
commodity ate hunr;rily into the incre..ien tal market for metals.
to recognize the reasons for these increment al choices:

It is not difficult~ .

shiftinc into jointly

produced cornr.iodit ies ma::es ui:.e of the firms e~:isting productio n facilitie s,
shifting into cor.1peting commodit ies mal::es use of their cJ:i::;tin3 r.1arl::eting facilitiei :..
There is mo:=c to it however.

na::;ic to the proccsi:. of 3rowth and displace

ment of commoditi cc a.:-c the twin enr;inei:. of changing technolog y and changing
demand.

The fi-::r.1::; a'l:'e themselve s deeply involved in influenci n3 these chances:

their large r.csea-;:-ch and Developm ent ci:.tablish mcnts arc constantl y developin g
new products baned on their resourcec and nc,-1 ways in which customcrc can use
their products; their large propa3and a activitie s arc geared to c::panding
demand for tbci:: c:::iatinz and new product lines.

In other word::; their tcch

nologica land p~opagand a efforts nece::ica~ ily include activitie s designed to
promote product::; uhich arc jointly produced, or competiti ve, to their main
product line::;.

ny such means they help insure themselve s againct the looses,

and help a::;sure thcmsclve a of the bencfitc, from lonc.,.te,:m i:.hifts in technoloz y
and/o:: demand uhich affect the enti:-c industry.
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On the bas:i .s cf c:n c.~~ nmin atinn of nea:-.

following picture of the typical admini~t~at ivc structive of'thc modern, large,
vertically- integrated multiproduc t firm:
"At the top is a general office. There, general executives and staff
specialists coordinate, appraise and plan goals and policies and allocate
resources to a number of quasi-autono cous, fairly self-contain ed divisions.
Each division handle::; a major product line or carries on the fir □ 's activities
in one larce geographic area. Each division'::; central office, in turn, adminis
ters a number of departments . Each of these dcpart □cnts is responsible for
the administrat ion of a major function - manufacturi ng, selling, purchasing or
producinr; of raw materials, en3inccrin3 , research, finance and the like. The
departr:ienta l headguarter s in its turn coordinates , appraises and plans for a
number of field units. At the lowest level, each field unit runs a plant or
works, a branch or district sales office, a purchasing office, an engineering
research laboratory, an accountinr; or other financial office, and the like.
The four types of administrat ive positions in a large multidivisi onal enter
prise arc thus: the field unit, the depart □cntal headquarter s, the division's
central office, and the general office. "13
Chandler noticed that the copper

co□panies

and Alcoa were amongst the ir.iportant

exceptions to those cor:ipanics l'Jhich evolved a highly formalized structure with
operations and

ad □inistration

so clearly differentia ted from long-term planning.

Thus

"Since World War I, the over-all policy-r.wl:i ng at Anaconda was carried out in weekly
meetings of the heads of the functional subsidiarie s 11, ll~ and "The Kcnnecot story has
15
finally, at Alcoa "At
been one of increasing centralized adr:iinistrat ivc control 11,
the central office, each of the three r::,;;ccutivc Vice-Presid ents has charge of a group
of several functional Departments .

11

16

and "Overall appraisal and planning are carried

on at Alcoa by the three E;:ccutivc Vice-Presid ents, the President, the Chairman of the
7
Board, and the Chairmen of the Executive and Finance Committees. ul In other words,
in these firms the function of long-terr.i planning did not become sharply differentiat ed
fror.1 the function of overall adrainistrat ion of the firra, but the centralizat ion of
control over Departments and field units l1as no less evident. lC The

□odel

stri:cturc

outlined by Chandler can, therefore, be used to illustrate the relationshi ps of the
raw material subsidiarie s which comprise the mineral-c:~p ort industries of the
Hinterland countries, with the firms of ,i1hich they arc

- l.J -

constituent part::;.

In terms of the four-tier systcr.i noted in the long quotation

above, the ra,~ oaterial sub::iidiary
the field unit.

exi::it::; at the lowest tier:

the level of

In this cater;ory would fall the copper-producing subsidiaries in

Chile, the crude oil and bau~dte-minin3 suboidiarics in the countries in and
around the Caribbean.

r~au material production

a::;

a whole for each firm fall::;

into the category of the department, while all the different ::ita3cs of vertically
integrated production - say, for coppe;: and aluminiur.1 - fall into the category of

the division ,,hich in some actual caseD al::io corrc::iponds to the enterprise as a
whole.

In the li:::;ht of thi::;> Chandler's description of the tasl~s and responsibilities

of each tic:- in the atructurc in instructive.
"Only in the firnt, the field unit, are the manar;er::i primarily
involved in carryinr; on or personally supervising day-to-day activities.
Even here, if the volur.ic of activity in large, they spend uuch of their
time on adr.iinistrative dutic::;. Dut · nuch duties arc larr,ely operational,
carried out within the fraoeworl~ of policies and procedure::; ::;ct by depart
mental headquarters and the hir-;hcr offices. The departmental and
divisional offices cay mal~c ::;or:ie lonr;-term decision::;, but becauoe their
e::ecutives \-Jorl~ within a comparable frameworl~ deteroined by the general
office, their primary adr.iinintrative activitie::; also tend to be tactical
or operational. The general office mal~es the broad stratcr;ic or
entrcprcncu:.·ial decisions as to policy and proccdu:;:-e,s and can do so
larnely because it has the final ::>ay in the allocation of the firm's
resource::; - men, money and r.mtcrial::; •· neces::;ary to carry out these
adraini::itrative decisions and actions and other::; raade with its approval
at any level. 11 19 (Hy emphasis)
A sharper definition of the otructurc of administration, cor.rrnodity flows

and cash flous \lithin the firm can be civen by diagrar.un.atic representation.

In 'Figures 1 and 2 i I have adapted Chand le;:'::; Chart

2.J

showinc the adrainistrativc

structure of the nultidivisional fi:::r:i,fo:;: e1e present purpooc.
firm is shoun (oil, copper)

alu□ iniup)

A uni-divisional

in which the Central Office ca-::rics out

bOth the function of long-term planninr; and that of central coordination of the
functional Departr:ients.

In Figure 1, In::itructions arc seen to flow downwards

- lG -

from the Ccnt:::al Office to the Depa:-tmental Headquarters and finally to the
Field Units, while information flous upwards from the Field Units to the Depart,:
mental Headquarters and finally to the Central Office.

The Central Office's

instructions to the Departments concc-::-n such r.:atters as the coordination of
mining, refinin:;, fabricating and sellin:3, which each Departmental Headquarters
then translates into operational output and shipment decisions for itD Field
Units to car.:y out.

The Field Unit·s supply _of i!1forrr.ation to the Departmental

Headquarters concern such r.1atters as local cost, labour, ta:~ and/or marketing
conditions.

This information is consolidated into Departr,1ental conditions for

each Departocnt, which can then be supplied to the Central Office to enable it
to take rational decisions.
Also represented in Fir;urc 1 arc the directions of the main commodity
movements ,-,ithin the

fir □.

The firo 1 s nain product r:iovcs fror.i. mines to refineries

to factories and finally to sales unitn, from l-Jhich it coco to the firm's customers.
Centralized purchases of supplies arc effected by the Purchasing Department's
units which then direct then to field unit::: of all Departments.

The volume,

.mix and prices of these intra-firr:i conmodi ty flows arc dcteroined by the Central
Office in accordance with the firm's objectives of maxi.mizinr; its lone-term
profitability and crouth, and minioizin:::; its lnbour, material!. and ta=:: disburse
ments,
To round out the picture, Fir;urc 2 .:eprcscnts the
within the [irr.1 on current account.

□ain

cash-flow movements

(C.::pital account r:i.ovements nould complicate

the Diagram and in any case present fc,·1 problems of e;::position).

Cash is shown

to be generated by the Sale'.'iDcpartoent and pl.1ced at the disposal of the
Finance Dcpa;..·tmcnt.

Finance in tu:;:-n allocates cash to all the Departments

(includinz itself) in accordance Hith the operational implications of the

Figure 1: Administrative
and Commodity Flows for
the vertically-integrated,
uni-divisional firm£.
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- 19 Central Office'::; decisions .

Cash is sent to the Fu·.:-chasinr; Departmen t to cover

the costs of centrally pu;:-chascd nupplicn, as well as the op-:!ration al costs
of that Departme nt.

C.::ish is ser.t to the other De partr.wntr, to cover locally

purchased supplies and other local con ts, i. c.

,•7.:lf'.CS,

naL:::.:icn and local ta~tes.

The cash surplus of the firm consistn of the c:~cess of the receipts of Finance
from Sales over its cash outlays to
other than Finance and Sales, the

11

~1~

the Dcpartrac nts.

For all Departmen ts

surplun II consists of the eJtcess of the

imputed value of the r;oods aad ::icrviccs supplied to othei~ Dcr>arLme nts over

the sum of the impnted value of the r;oodc and nerviccs tfll:cn from other
Departme nts plun the canh outlays received
at the Depa;:-tmc ntal nnd Field l'ni~ lcvcis

21

fro□.

Fin1rncc.

Ilencc thene surpluses

have neither a cash nor an operation al

significa nce, they arc nccountin e itccJ dctcruice d centrally in accordanc e with

The relations hip of cnch r.:m r,1atcriaJ producir:r; nuhsiclfar y l·n.th its

parent firm can now be easily idcnti.ficc l by lool:inr; at the ponition of the
mining field unit in the diar;rnm.

Each such unit receive::; frora its prent

(i) instructio n5 about the level, nntu:re .2nd destinati on of itn output; (ii)
goods and/ or services eithc,. prcduccd uj thin the firm or p•.t:-chascr:1. centrally ;
and (iii) cash to meet loc:1 l pu:rchv.sen , labou::- and ta:: paym~ntn.

In turn it

provides the parent with (:i.) the rau ra.:1tcrialn .:is innt:ructc d, l'nd (ii) informati on
about productio n condition n to asnist future d~cisj_on-::-::;il~ine.

This means that fo,: mnny, H not all, ::.·aw r.1atcri_c1l subsidiar ies many of
the decisions which the tradition ~l theory of the fire ~ssurae::i to be internal

decisions are ta~cn ~:tcrnall y.

The level, price and dcntlnati on of output;

the sourcca, priccn and ponnibly npccifi.ca tions o::: inputs; and the technique s

- 20 -

of production utilized, arc all contained in instructions or decisions previously
ta1:en by _the hi3hcr offices.

The objective of the manager of Chile Copper Co,

or Rcynoldo Jamaica l-Iines is not "profit-maximization" per

~

at all; it is to

produce the quantum of natcrial ordered by the higher office::: ,,ith the least
possible delay and at the least pos::::ible local costs, and place it at the
disposal of the pa::-cnt company.

For those of us who arc accustor:icd to thin!: of

a "Hanazcr" as sooeonc with independent initiative, it would be r.10:.:c appropriate
to thinl: of the manager of the :.:a,-1 r:wterial subsidiary ac bein:3 in rauch the same
position as a plant supervisor.
A cecond level of structu::al dependence for the ra,., materialsubsidiary

relates to the rate and direction of chance of its activities.

That is, the

rate C?f.new invcstnent and of e:-:pan::.io1.1. of ca;,acity, the techniques of production
used, and the a,:"quicition of

noi-1.

'.'r:i.a:::-1:et::; 11 a:rc all decisions which a:ce derived from

the long-tern planning decisions ta:~en by the Central Office.
illustration:

To :3ivc only one

it rnal:es very little sense to analyse the degree to ,-,hich the

raw material ::iubsidiary
determined centrally,

11

11

rcinvcsts 11 its profits.

Reinvestment policies arc

reinvestment 11 in the raw material subsidiary is derived

from the deterraincd e:~pansion of end-product capacity and decisions about the
locus of ncu rau material capacity.

It is quite possible for the firm's

global rcinvcstr.icnt ratio to be hizh but its reinvestocnt in any ::;ivcn subsidiary

low; the opposite is also quite possible; and in the real ll01.·ld both phenor.iena

have been observed.
II
Hinterland r:conony And The Ilincral-I:::port Industr/

2

Against this bacl:ground of the cmcq;ence, structure and behaviour through
time of the vertically-integrated nultinational firn, it is pos::.iblc to arrive at

- 21 certain insights about the mineral-c:;po:rt industries of the Hinterland.

Such

insights arc yielded by an understandinc of the subsidiary-parent company
relationship.

In this part of the paper I wish to discuss in bread outline the

question of foreign ownership, the question of output-determination, the effects
of the industries on the "national" economics in which they arc located, and the
attempts of the Government to transr.iit economic development from the industry to
the national economy by its ta::ation and expenditure policies.
(i) Forei13n OwnersbjJ.~.
the natural r~sourcc

Seen in its historical pcr~pectivc, the acquisition of
industries of Hinterland countries by Hetropolitan firms

was merely the result of the e:;:tcnsion of a process which had already taken place
in the Mctropole.

This ,-,as the process by which small-scale, single-stage,

competitive producers oriented to local mad:ets were swallowed up by large,
vertically-intecrated, oligopolistic producers oriented to the national and
ultimately to the international marl~et.

In Venezuela and in Chile, as in the

United States, copper mining and oil c::traction ,-,ere in the hands of small
producers in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Hhat then took place was

a revolution in economic organization which cut virtually unresisted across
national boundarieo, e:{tendin:3 itself into the American Hinterland.

Independent

miners in the Ilctropole and HinterlandG alike were transforr.ied into wagelabourers, and small capitalist, into rainority stocl~holders, of the large
corporations.

For the miners of l-Iontam:1 the enemy became the "capitalists

from New Yorl~ ", for the Venezuelan.s and Chileans it was to become the "foreign
capitalisto" or the "Yanl~ee Ir.iperiali.sts "; both perhaps, unconsciously, were
attacking the f:lame historical development.

The concern about the denationalization

of Chilean copper which aroused a lively debate in thet country from the

- 22 second decade of the century,
complaints about

11

23

waG clearly historically analogou3 to the

biG business" which becan to be heard in the United States

a generation before.
It ia interesting here to consider briefly two of the reasons most
frequently advanced for the past and continuinc prevalence of foreign capital
investment in the:,e industries in the Hinterland countrieG.

These arc the alleged

shortage of capital, and the· alleged.- tcch.nological backwardness of these countries.
In at lea:Jt one historical instance - that of Chile - it uas strongly
argued by contemporary national observers, including economists, that the
quantity of capital funds required to set up the industry on the new basis
was available within the country.
yield other cases.

2L}

It is possible that further research could

But even if for the sal~e of the analysis it was assumed that

these countriea were short of capital at the time, this by itself doca not
demonstrate that they had to rely on direct foreir;n investment. Purely on the
basis of the historical profitability of these industries, it could easily be
shown that had hypothetical national capitalists borrowed abroad the funds
required for the early investments, the subsequent flow of profita was sufficient
to service this indebtedness and ultimately repay it, aa well as to pay dividends
and to finance at least a part of further

.
f·rom interna
.
1 sources. 25
investment

The immediate reply uill naturally be "perhaps, but could they have sold the
product on an internationa 1 market controlled by a few oligopolistic firms?"
This is precinely the point:

the national capitalists - or more properly the

small, single-ata~e producera, - were defeated at the level of economic organization.
Moreover, the defeat admitted no recovery through the mechanisms of the private
capital market:

the corporations normally own all of the capital stock of their
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raw material subsidiaries and do not trade this stocl: even on the metropolitan
capital market.

;:ven if national capital was short then but is available in whole

or in part ~ . the stocl: is simply not for sale.
It is virtually the sar.ie where technolocy is concerned.

In most cases,

the technolocy used initially in these industries was not cnorr.iously complex
or inaccessible.

In the cases of the : 1 Tcnientc and Chuquicamata mines in

Chile, the technical changes needed to bring the deposits into lar3e-scale
production were carried out after foreir;n capital acquired the mines; that is,
the necessary technical change was induced by the cor.uncrcial potential of the
deposits in the conte:,;:t of a rapidly crowing marl:et.

Subsequently the process

of technological change was institutionalized by the r,esearch and Development
departments of the corporations.

Local capitalist::; and the local Government

could not develop either the incentive or the resources to engai:;e in their own
technological research, since they did not own the industry.
The real question to be answered, therefore, is why is it that these
countries failed to develop large-scale, vertically-inte13ratcd, capital-and
technology-intensive corporations capable of resisting the advance of the
Metropolitan firms.

Insofar as the revolution in economic organization in the

United States was itself the product of revolutions in the scale of demand
and methods of production, then the further question must be why these changes
in demand and technology failed to take place in the countries South of the
Rio Grande as well.

The ansi-1er ta!:cs ui:: to the roots of development and under

development itself.

It almost certainly lies in the differing effects of the

different typen of colonial economic institutions in the New Horld,
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on the

potential for the steady growth of the purchasini::; power of the r.1ai::s of the
population; and on the opportunities for upward social and economic mobility

.. 2t~ enjoyed by the numerically dominant ethnic and/or social groups. 27

If this

interpretat ion is broadly correct, then the origins of the institution al dependence
of these induGtrics oust be sought in the historical evolution of the economics
from centuries before.

(ii) Output-Dete rmination.

To say that the mineral-e2;:p ort industries are

dependent on e,;:ternal deaand is to misn the point in an important sense.

Output

is rather dependent on the needs of and alternative s open to the particular
firms whose subsidiarie s
possible case:

operate in the industry.

Let us assuae the simplest

a :::ingle metropolita n firn producing and sellin3 the end-product

on a sin13le metropolita n market, d:rmiinc its raw material from a sinclc
Hinterland nource.

The cost conditions for the e:;:troction of the raw material

form part of the total cost conditions of the firm:

thene total cost conditions,

in conjunction with demand corrditions for the end-oroduct , deterainc the
equilibriur.1 quantity trc:dcd on the

□ar:~et.

This equilibriuo (given the ratio of

raw material to end-product ) determines the level of output/expo rts of the
mit).cral resource industry in the Hinterland.
In thin, the simpliest case, there is a clear and unambi13uoun relation
ship between der:iand for the end- product and the output.· (derived demand) for the
raw material.

Changes i.n the level of output will depend on changes in the

structure of relative prices and in the level of income on the metropolita n
market, in conjunctioc. with the relevant elasticitie s of der:iand for the end
product.

They will also depend on chances :i.n the: firm's cost conditions and in

the ra,-1 material:

end product rc=,tio.

However in the rc.::il Horlc1 there 2rc many marl:ets, .:aany firma and many supply
sources.

Typically, the cc arc a r~ 11mber of firr:i.s in each market, drawing their
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- 26 Another vital implication is that the rate of growth of A's output relative
to B's depends exclusively on the rate of growth of Firm:: relative to Firm Y.
Thuo a Hinterland tied to a non-dynamic firr.i. will share the fate of that firm,
and vice versa.
Now let us cive each firm one additional Hinterland to choose from
in the satisfaction of its raw material needs.

Countries A and Care now

attached to ;: and countries B and D arc attached to Y (Case 3 in Figure 3).

In allocating its raw material requirements between A and C, :~ will presumably
use the "least-cost" principle.

In effect, :~ 's minimum cost curve for

different levels of its end-product output includes the optimum combinations of
A's and C's output for the total rau material requirements implied by the different
levels of end-product output,

Hhat is now happening is that country A is competing

with country C ,-Jithin the structure of the firm; its output is determined,
alia, by its production costs relative to C's.

~

Its competition with other raw

material produces - Band D - also exists, but it is very indirect and roundabout.
One ir:iplication of this is that if X's alternative supply source were a differ
ent country with different co:::;t conditionc · fror:i C':::;, A would be cor.ipeting with a diffcrcnt set of co5t condition5 .:ind uou~d alnost certainly have a different level. of rutp..it.
In other words since the level of raw material output for any given country depends
on the alternative suppliers with which it competes through the st:ructure of the
firm, a different combination of firms with countries implies a different distribution
of raw material output between countries.
Finally, let us assume that both :: and Y draw supplies £:i:or:i A, with the
other conditions unchanged.

This' ir; represented as Case

l,,.

in Figure 3.

This brinr;s

us closcot to the conditions in the real world, where oany oineral-e~~port countrie::i
have more than one firm drawing supplies from within its borders.

A's output is

now the sum total of the requirements of ,;: and of Y which is drawn from that country.
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The Framework
Figure 3:
of Out-put Determination
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of the nationa l econor.1y 's 1:;rowth and developm ent to L-ranscend the performa nce of the
raw materia l subsidia ries located within it and providin g it with much of its dynamic?
(iii) Depende nce and Underde velopme nt in Mineral Economy
The fact is that in all the mineral -export economi es in Hinterla nd
America the problem of externa l structur al dependen ce remains acute, and shows
little sign of being substan tially relieved in the near future.

I say "remain s"

because most of these economi es have had at least twenty to thirty years of
active Government interven tion allegedl y designed to diversif y the bases of
economic growth.

Many of them (e.g. Venezue la, Chile, Trinidad -Tobago and

Jamaica) have moreQver been able to finance these policies with relative ly
large tax revenues made availab le from the mineral industry itself.

The

strategy of using the industry 's tax revenues for expendi ture designed to
reduce the economy 's dependen ce on the industry bas been embodied in the
popular consciou sness in Venezue la in the phrase sembrar el petroleo ("sow the
petroleu m") for more or less the last thirty years.
It would be unneces sary - and probably impossib le - to discuss all the
factors respons ible for the persiste nce of dependen ce in these economie s in
every individu al case.

I wish rather to suggest that there are certain features

inherent in the terms on which these raw materia l subsidi aries operate which
are partly respons ible for the fact that (a) they do not transmi t their growth
to other strategi c growth sectors in the nationa l economy, and (b) the nationa l
economy stubbor nly resists Government attempts to reduce its structu ral
depende nce on the mineral -export sector.
(a) The Mineral -Export Industry and the Nationa l Econnmy: Before Government
Interven tion
The first set of conside rations concern the failure of the mineral 
export sectors to serve as cntulys ts

for the diversif ied developm ent of the
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national economy, in other words, to play the same role in the twentieth
century Hinterland countries as trade-oriented industries played in North
America and Australia

in the nineteenth.

Why have they remained "enclaves",

better integrated with the outside world than with their host economies,
and giving rise to the phenomenon which Rostow and Demas have described as
"growth without development"?
The specific manifestations of this has been, in every case investigated,
the fact that (i) few purchases of local agricultural and manufactured goods
are made by the industry, (ii) the capital/labour ratio used in the industry
is high relative to the rest of the national economy, and as a result, labour
productivity and wage rates are relatively high, but the total labour force
and the total wage bill are low relative to the national labour force and the
national wage bill respectively; (iii) profits and depreciation form a high
proportion of the value of the industry 1 s output (also as a result of the high
capital/labour ratio) but this surplus is either repatriated to the foreign
owners or reinvested within the mineral-export industry itself: it is not
invested in other national industries where it can cont-ribute to diversified
economic growth; finally (iv) as a result of (i) to (iii) above, the value
of the industry's output "returned' 1 to the national economy(principally local
purchases, wages and taxes) is well below the total value of its "sales."
In explaining all this, there are certain predictable argwrents avail
able from what we might call Metropolitan "Economic Development" theory29
on the one hand, and from Metropolitan Marxist theory on the other. "Economic
Development" theory ascribes the smallness of loc a 1 purchases by the industry
to the underdevelopment of the intermediate and capital-goods manufacturing

industrie s, and the fact that extractiv e industrie s use little intermedi ate
goods in any case.

The high capital/la bour ratio is held to be due to the

inherent capital intensity of the industry, and the accrual of profits abroad
is ascribed to the unavoidab le dependenc e on foreign capital because of
capital shortage at home.

Often it is virtually implied that what does remain

in the nat:lonal economy in the form of "Returned Value" is largesse which
the country earns without contribut ing anything, and for which it should be
thankful.
Marxist theory
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on the other hand, would explain the capital intensity

of the industry in terms of the continued accumulat ion and deepening of capital;
and in explainin g the smallness of "Returned Value", would assert that the
very purpose and motivatio n of imperiali st capital is the extractio n of a
surplus from the poor countries .
I do not doubt that most of these arguments contain an element of
validity.

It is abviously true that underdeve loped countries have underdeve loped

manufactu ring industrie s, and that bauxite and copper mining and crude oil
productio n use relativel y little intermedi ate goods.

It is also obvious that

the processes of electroli c productio n of copper and aluminum, and the process
of oil refining, inherentl y involve large amounts of capital in relation to
labour.

Likewise it is obviously the case that the purpose and motivatio n

of all capital investmen t is to earn a surplus of returns over cost5; so that
direct foreign investmen t inevitabl y leads to a subsequen t outflow of profits.
But in some respects the explanati ons raise as many questions as they
purport to answer.

It is not clear, for example, why the mineral-e xport

·industry does not exert ani preS/3..!l..!'.~ for the establishm ent of national supply-

ing industries, such as capital goods industries for the supply of the capital
equipment, and intermediate goods industries for the supply of the materials
used in such refining as is carried outlocally.

Nor is there any full

explanation for the virtual absence of any tendency for the industry's factor

propo~tions to adjust to the relatively capital-short, labour-plentiful situation
in these economies. Capital shortage ar, an explanation of total foreign owner9hip looks weaker and weaker in the face of the emergence, in countries such
as Venezuela and Chile, of a class of domestic capitalists eager to put their
money to work.

Finally, if the objective of imperialist capital is to extract

a surplus from the ~ntr::,: as such, and assuming that other profitable invest..
ment opportunities exist within the country outside of the mineral-export sector,
why is the surplus not in-,1ested in these other sectors after having made a
killing in the mineral-export sector?
My main contention here is that it is to the institutional integration
of these industries with multimational corporate systems that we should ascribe
their lack of integration with the national economies.

Take first the question

of the lecus of supp~~:, o~ :;_np1..1ts and capital equipment to the subsidiaries
which comprise the industry.

There is every reason to expect that such goods

will be supplied to the subsidiary by the headquarters of the parent firm,
and will be obtained from metropolitan sources.

First, some of the inputs

may be produced by the parent :·:i::m itself, as a result of its horizontal
integration.

Some of the aluminium firms, for example, themselves produce the

caustic soda for the alu~ina process and the cryolite for the aluminium proce~s.
Second, the purchase of materials and capital equipment for all subsidiaries
will in all probability be centralized by the firm's central office, in oTder
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to effect economies and to standardize the processes used and the goods
produced at each stage of output.

Under these circumstances it is perfectly

natural that the firm will use well-established metropolitan suppliers.

Third,

the transport of goods to the subsidiary overseas may involve little or no
real cost to the firm, insofar as they can be shipped on the company's own
empty ships on the return journey after offloadins the raw material from over
seas.

Both Anaconda and A!can Aluminum Ltd. have used their shipping subsidiar

ies to carry fuel and other naterials to their plants in Chile and in Jamaica
respectively.

Finally, it must be point~d out that while there may be a fGreign

exchange shortage for the natimv,11 economy of the Hinterland, this may :·never
,,,.::J?Y :· reflected in the transact:Lons between the subsidiary and the parent firm.

In terms of intra-firm account:Lig, the shipment of produce from the subsidiary
to the parent firm gives ·:-.;~.c ;rn·osidiary a credit in its accounts with the
parent, against which sup; ::.ies and interest on the farmer's debt with the latter
are debited, as well
local taxes.
parent.

.:1S

cash transferB to cover local purchases, wages and

The residua}. :form." tl:P. "surplus" which merely remains with the

On those occasions when the subsidiary's debits with its parent exceed

its credits - usually because of a large capital investment programme - this
deficit may be covered simply by an :l.ncrease in the parent's stockholding
or interest-bearing investment in the subsidiary, i.e. by lending to the subsi32
.
d 1.ary.

This type of economic organization ensures that foreign exchange

is automatically available to finance che imports of the mineral-export industry,
the producing units in the industry feel no incentive to seek out local supplies
or to promote the development of supplying industries, even if they had the
degree of independence from the:i.r head offices which would permit them to do so.

Closely associated with the question of the degree of linkages between
the industry and local manufacturing is that of the degree to which the raw

material is processed or refined into intermediate goods - not to speak of
end-products - within the national economy.

Since some of the processes use

considerable intermediate materials they establish permissive conditions for
the stimulation of supplying industries, as well as create additional national
value added in the form of wages and taxes.

However the history of the mineral

export industries of Hinterland America provides a virtual classic story of
their relegation to those activities just necessary to get the materials out
of the country.

In Chile the subsidiaries of Anaconda and Kennecot actually

increased their production of the low-valued blister copper and reduced their
p~oduction of the higher-valued fire-refined and electrolytic copper in the
period after the Second Horld Har.

Guyana and Surinam were exporting

bauxite for about forty years before production of alumina began.

In Venezuela...

the proportion of crude oil refined nationally had reached only one-quarter
in the middle of the 1950 decade; ten years later it was still only slightly
higher than one-third.

In every case, the pattern can be traced to the vertical integration
of the
of raw material output in the Hinterland with the refining capacity
··•.

companies in the Metropole.

Both Anaconda and Kennecot built electrol:y tic:_.

copper refineries in the United States to process blister copper from thei~

Chilean subsidiaries, in the post-War period.

Alcoa and Ale an Aluminiur:1 Ltd;

built and expanded alumina and aluminiuo plants in the
bauxite from the Guianas.

u.s.

and Canada to proceaa

Jersey Standard and Shell built huge refineries in

Aruba and Curacao to process their Venezuelan crude.

It is therefore the

-
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pattern of locational allocation determined by the needs of the corporate
economies which is responsible for the considerabl e underutiliz ation of the
potential of these industries to serve as "growing points" within the national
economies.
It is true that the tariff policies of Metropolita n Governments in
imposing higher duties on finished goods than on raw materials are partly
responsible for the firms' location of processing capacity in their home
countries.

But they are by no means a full explanation .

Powerful factors

have operated at the level of the internal economics of the firm.

In some

cases it was cheaper to expand processing plants which had originally been
based on metropolita n raw materials, to process the materials coming from
abroad, than to build new plants overseas.

Operational economies of scale

could also be obtained from such a course.

Another advantage is that it

allowed the firms to adjust processing plants to accomodate to the desired
distributio n of raw material production between different sources.

Location

at any one Hinterland source might have committed the £inn to drawing all
the feed for the plant from that source, thereby precluding "least-cost "
adjustments over time.

Another factor arose out of the strategic significanc e

of these materials during wartime.

'Shipments from Chile and the Caribbean

were particularl y susceptible to submarine attacks during the Second World
War, and the fear operated during the Korean War as well,

By shipping the

unrefined rather than the refined product the value of the material lost
from. any sinking was minimized: both the corporation s and their home Govern
ments had an identity of interest on this point.

Finally, there was the

well-known factor that the companies preferred (and still prefer) to risk as
little capital as possible in countries where the political order cannot be

relied upon to regard their existence as sacrosanct.
The next question concerns the adoption of techniques in these
industries which are not only capital-intensive relative to the national
economy at the outset, but frequently become increasingly capital-intensive
over time.

An outstanding example is the Venezuelan and Dutch Antilles oil

industries, which shed 33 and 70 percent of their labour force respectively
between 1950 and 1966, although output doubled in the former and remained the
same in the latter ove~ the same period.

The virtually total failure of the

mineral-export industry to adapt to the relatively labour-abundant, capital
scarce nature of the Hinterland economies becomes perfectly understandable
if ·we consider the factor-endowment situation of the corporate economy of
which each producing unit is an organic part.

Capital is relatively plentiful

and cheap to the multinational corporation; first because of its large use of
depreciation allowances and retained earnings for new investment,and second
because it has direct access to the highly developed capital markets of the
Metropoles.

In contrast, the skilled labour needed to operate the machinery

and equipment in the Hinterland is relatively scarce, and the firms them
selves often have to bear the costs of training it,

Moreover, the technology

of production embodied in the capital goods which the company must purchase
for its new investment, has become increasingly capital-intensive in response
to the increasingly capital-rich nature of Metropolitan economy.

The absence

of an indigenous capital-goods sector in the ~interlands appropriate to the
factor-endowments there precludes the very availability of production processes
and capital goods which are relatively more labour-intensive.

In summary,

the price of capital relative to that of labour to the firms does not represent

the social opportunity cost of using capital relative to labour in the
Hinterland (especially considering the high costs of using direct foreign
capital); and the same reasons underlying this also mean that a labour-inte n
sive technology is simply not available.
It is to the structure of the corporation that we must also look for the
explanation of the failure of the surplus of the mineral-exp ort industry to
be invested in other sectors of the national economy.

The surplus is in

reality tied to the needs and strategy of the corporation as a whole.

Indeed

as we saw earlier the surplus of the raw material subsidiary is an accounting
item which has neither a cash nor an operational significanc e to the sub
sidiary itself, hence it is simply that part of the firm's total cash surplus
,-ihich it elects to "impute II to the subsidiary for purposes of tax minimizatio n.
How much it decides to reinvest there is a different question again: it depends
on the determined expansion of end product capacity and the determined location
of new raw material capacity.

What is not reinvested in the given raw material

subsidiary is not available to the national economy but to the corporate
economy.

Hence it is allocated in a manner consistent with the firm's strategy,

between different raw rnate-:ial subsidiarie s, different refineries, fabricators,
sales and other departmenta l units, different end-product s, and dividends,
debt reductions and additions to working capital.
Finally, there is the question of the "reliance" on foreign capital in
the industry, which was discussed earlier in the paper.

Suffice it here to

recall that, viewed in its historical perspective , the denationa-l iu.tion of the
oineral industries of the Hinterland was cr.craly the corolarry of the multi
nationaliza tion of the Metropolita n corporation s.

And further, that the practices

of the corporation s make it impossible for national capitalists to restore

the industries to national ownership.

The large fraction of the industry's sales

value accruing abroad in the form of depreciation and net profits is only one
of the more visible consequences of this.
(b) The Mineral Export-Industry and the National Economy: Achievements and
Frustrations of G,overnment Intervention
The rules of the game, therefore, mean that the struggle of the Hinter
land economy for a larger share of the industry's sales - a greater share of
11

Returned 11 value in total value - is chanelled chiefly through the efforts of
the labour force, and the national Government.

However, there are limits to

the extent to which the labour force can enlarge its share in the industry's
value, as distinct from raising wage rates. First, since the labour content
per unit of physical output in the industry is low, large increases in wage
rates can be conceded

to militant mine workers with relatively small increases

in labour share - indeed, mechanization can and often does reduce the wage
content of output even as wage rates increase.

(In Venzuela between 1950 and

1966, labour income per man in the oil industry trebled, but total labour
income as a share of the value of output fell from 15 to 11 percent because of
the substitution of capital for labour.)

Moreover, the bargaining power of

labour is frequently weakened by the existence of a large reserve of unemployed
labour and by deliberately repressive policies of the national Government.
Indeed, the history of the mineral-export industries in the American
Hinterland shows that the fact that the wage bill is one of the chief components
of the national take from the industry is no guarantee of Government's support
for efforts to increase it.

Oilfield workers in Vene,..;uela were forcibly suppressed

in the 1930s and 1940s, as l1ere Chilean copper workers in the 1940s.

For
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years i labour unions in the refineri es of the Dutch islands faced officia l
oppositi on, and in Trinidad -Tobago the passage of legislat ion to control
strikes in 1965 was aimed mainly at the oil workero.

The reasons for the

militanc y of the mine ·i:-.1orkers on the one hand, and the frequent hostilit y of
the nationa l Governmen= to them on the other hand, arise directly out of the
nature of the industry .

The fact that the workers are well-pa id relative ly

to the mass of the labour force, and have relative ly skilled tasks to per
form, give them much greater confiden ce in their attitude to management by
compari son to farm workers wha are subject to traditio nal paterna listic
relation ships.

At the same time) the fact that ownersh:i.p and management in

the industry are foreign, and frequen tly cultura lly and racially distinc t from
the nationa l populati on, sharpens the inherent antagoni sm between labour and
capital.

Left-win g leadersh ip is therefor e frequen tly quite strong in the

labour movement in the ind11stry .

Faced with the fact or the prospec t of the

emergen ce of an independ ent base of power in the
politica l system, a nationa l

Government unsure of its own popular
complex.

support inevitab ly develops an insecur. ity

Moreover, where the Government and the companie s have reached ~n under

standing on the question s of ta:rntion and the rate of expansio n, militan t
labour demands threaten to upset the delicate ly balanced "parters hip.

11

Indeed,

the very existenc e of a large-sc ale state apparatu s in many cases is.the direct
creation of the taxes paid by the industry : if militan t labour demands threaten
the rate of expansio n of the industry determin ed by the companie s, it threaten s
the rate of expansio n of the state apparatu s as well.
But even where bargaini ng is relative ly free the capital- intensit y of
the industry and the possibi lities of continui ng capital/ labour substitu tion

1
limit the possible growth of labour s share, as has been pointed out.

The

real locus of the struggle to increaze the national "take" from the industry
inevitab ly emerges as the distr.ib uticn of the large surplus between the foreign
company and the nntions l Government~ Le. between deprecia tion-cum -net profits
on the one hand and taxes on the other.
In some importan t cases (Venezue la, Chile, Surinam and Jamaica) it is
possible to distingu ish clearly ~n initial period of light and indiffer ent
taxation followed by a period of growing tcx rates and attentiv e regulati on
of the factors governin g the taz take.

In Venezue la .:.r.d Chile, the first

period lasted up to the D~press~ on ye~rs of the 1930s and was associat ed with
the laissez- faire a~tituce s of contemp orary Governm ents and a low nationa l
awarene ss of the large surpluse s accruing to the foreign owners of the industry .
The Depress ion years precipi tcted a radical change in the degree of state
interven tion in the econo,ny :.:r.d

.::i

:rap:.td growth of nationa l interest in increas

ing "Returne d Value" by means of tax maasure s.

In Surinam and Jamaica the

first period lasted up until the middle 1950s and was due to ignoranc e of the
real potenti al of extracti ng tayes from the industry_.,

AG

well as the indiffer ence

and/or hostilit y of the Dutch and Di:-itish colonia l adminis trations to the
question .

Renegot iation of the tax arrangem ~nts ,1as the work of the first

generati on of ne.tiona l politici ans anxious to increase the spending power of
the embryon ic nationa l atate.
In all the economi es concerne d~ the growth of the industry or the growth
1
of the rate of ta;~ation , or both, rc:.ulted in the :Reture.e d Value" of the

industry becomir..g

'3

majo::- source of foreign ei:chnngc. and .the tax payoents of the

industry becoming e :.:,;~)or source of Govs;.·nmen't re·,.1enue.

Th:i.a developm ent has

-

i:..

-
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-41The dependen ce of the two systems on the subsidia ry is inheren tly
asymme trical: i.e. the nationa l economy is more depende nt on the subsidia ry than
is the multina tional corpora tion, in spite of (indeed, perhaps because of) the
fact that the subsidia ry is an institut ional part of the latter economy and
not of the former,

The reasons are as follows, First, most compani es draw

their raw materia ls from a number of differen t gee-pol itical supply sources,
and negotia te with the politic al authori ties of each one separate ly.

The

country however depends on one or at best a small number of subsidi aries and,
what is more importan t, the inheren tly non-disc riminato ry nature of Government
mining and tax legislat ion means that the Government negotia tes with the mineral
industry as a collecti ve whole, irrespec tive of the number of subsidi aries
in it.

Second, the profits "imputed " to the raw materia l subsidia ry by the

parent firm forms only a part of its total profits imputed at differen t
stages of producti on, and the location of the differen t compsne nts of its
total profits can be shifted from stage to stage and therefor e from country
to country with a large degree of corpora te freedom.

While it is true that

there are other sources of tax revenue for the nationa l economy, in all the
mineral -export nationa l economi es,no other single industry has a taxable
capacity of the size and growth potenti al of the mineral -export industry .
It is however, at the level of long-ter m growth and developm ent that
tbe asymme trical nature of the dependen ce is most clearly shown.

For while

the strategi c planning of the corpora tion ensures that its continue d growth
does not depend on the life of any one raw materia l subsidia ry or even on any
one product, the attempts of the Governm ents to do the same thing for the
nationa l economy have invariab ly met with limited success.
of some of these frustrat ions that I next turn.

It is to an analysis
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-4~fundamental problems of Hinterland economies is obviously beyond the scope
of this paper.

Attention here is focussed on some of the frustrations of

applying the strategy in the particular conditions of mineral-export economies,
and which arise in spite of the fact that the mineral industries often give
these Governments large and growing revenues with which to finance the strategy.
One set of frustrations arise of certain external diseconomies of the
mineral industry in relation to agriculture and forestry.

In the first

place, the supply of land and of labour to the agricultural sector may be
adversely affected.

Both the alumin:ill~and the oil companies are in the habit

of holding large areas of the national territory with proven or probable
reserves of the desired material.

The objectives are of course to maximize

the long-term availability of raw materials to the parent firm and to
minimize its availability to competitors, objectives which frequently give
rise to holdings far in excess of what is used by the firm over a long
period of time.

Such holdings significantly reduce the actual or potential

national acreage which is held or used principally for purposed of agriculture
and forestry.

This also extends to the use of associated natural resources

&Ht4h as water and local building materials.
The effect of the industry in reducing the supply of agricultural
labour is one of its better-known external diseconomies.

The relatively high

wages paid by the companies and the quasi-urban areas established by them for
extractive and administrative activities attract a heavy migration from the
asricultural areas.

In addition, when the Government begins large-scale

expenditure programmes the capital city usually absorbs a dispropo~tionately
large share of expenditures, and this acts as a magnet to rural labour as well.
The result is that labour for the traditional low-productivity, low-income
agricultural activities becomes in inc~easingly short supply at the going

-44wage rate on the plantatio ns and haciendas , and at the going level of average
real income on the minifundi a. Farm workers and the younger members of the
farm family prefer to seek employmen t in the mining areas and in the capital
city, or simply prefer to be unemploye d, rather than work for what are now
considere d to be unconscio nably low returns.

To bring about some degree of

rationali ty in the structure of wages and incomes would require (a) land reform
and technical change in the agricultu ral sector, and (b} the institutio nal
integrati on of the mineral industry with the national economy.

Both require

fundamen tal institutio nal changes which are not possible without political
changes as_ well.
The mineral industry also indirectl y affects the pattern of commodity
demand for agricultu ral products.

The small group of well-paid mine workers

and the growing group of relativel y well-paid public sector employees give
rise to patterns of food consumpti on in which the simple starchy staples
tradition ally produced by peasant farmers become progressi vely less important ,
33
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products with a higher and more balanced nutrition al content, such as high
protein foods, meat and dairy products; and products associate d with Metropol itan
urban and suburban life-style s, such as processed and pre-cooke d foods, are
amongst those with high income-e lasticitie s.

The initiation of activitie s to

satisfy these demands is beyond the capacity of the tradition al agricultu ral
sector, especiall y peasant agricultu re, acting by itself.

They involve not

only quantitat ive and qualitati ve changes in the supply of inputs to the sector,
but also compleme ntary investmen ts in transport , storage and distribut ion
facilitie s, and compleme ntary marketing policies.
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A second set of frustrations arise out of the external diseconomies
of the mineral industry to the manufacturing sector.

In the first place,

the most immediate and obvious possibilities for the establishment of a
dynamic manufacturing industry lies in most cases precisely with the mineral
industry itself; i.e. in creating a whole network of backward and forward
linkages centered on the processes and products of the industry, which would
eventually grow to acquire a dynamic of its mm.

This means initiating the

production of capital and intermediate goods,supplying the needs of

and

using the products of the industry, and carrying its vertieal integration within
the national economy forward to the production of final goods where possible.
It is precisely these possibilities which are to a large extent precluded by the vertically integrated structure of the corporation.

The standard

ization of processes and products and the minimization of costs required by
the corporate economic system mean that the purchase of all important supplies
is centralized at the Purchasing Department on its equivalent in the Metropole,
and almost certainly obtained from Metropolitan suppliers; the gearing of
raw material capacity in the Hinterland to processing capacity in the Metropole
means that Hinterland output is not free to be processed locally.

In other

words the possibilities of utilizing the resource as a basis of backward and
forward linkages within the national economy is restricted by its already
existing use as a basis of backward and forward linkages withing the corporate
economy.

34

There are also diseconomies which, like those which apply to the
agricultural sector, arise out of the effect of the industry on the structure
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of wage rates amd of consuncr dcoand throughout the cconony.

The relatively

high wage rates in the mineral industry tend to set the pattern of wage
rates throughout the economy, especially in manufacturing where an occupation
by-occupation comparison witb the mine workers is often possible.

Wage rates

in the mineral industry display a persistent tendency to rise, as the mine
workers compare their wage scales with those. of metropolitan workers in the
same industry and with their own rising average productivity, due to capital/
labour substitution.

This exerts a continual upward pressure on wage-rates

in manufacturing. where the capital/labour ratios, and therefore average
labour productivity, is lower, and the weight of wages in total production
costs higher.
TWo adverse results can be immediately seen to follow from this. One
is that the consequently high structure of production costs in the sector
severely weakens its ability to successfully compete with imports, and achieve
the overall objective of substantial import-substitution which is self-sustaining.
The second is that the structure of high labour costs in particular encourages
the tendency for capital/labour subsitution already inherent in the dependence
of Hinterland economies on Metropolitan technology and corporations. This
35
capitalseverely dampens the employment-creating capacity of the sector.
intensity also makes it more difficult for manufacturing plants to achieve low
operational costs on the basis of the domestic market alone.
The effects of the industry in creating enclaves of high-income mining
and Government employees also biases the structure of demand for manufactures
in the direction of relatively expensive consumer durables such as motor-cars
and household equipment.

These are precisely the kinds of goods which it is

most difficult for indigenous enterprise

using indigenous technology and

•· L; 7

-

indigenous inputs, to undertake in the early stages of its developraent.

This

is all the norc so 3iven the tieing of consumption to particular brand-naocs
such as Kclvinator and Chevrolet - which the r.1Ultinational nanufacturing
c oopanics have popularized oultinationally.

Indeed, this applies even to

the sioplcr nanufactures such as ::;oft-drinks (e.g. Coca-Cola) and cigarettes
(e.g. Chesterfield).
industry is a :::c.t of

Hhat therefore encr:;es by the name of nanufacturing
11

tariff-hopin3 11 a::;scnbly-plants established by oetropolitan

coopanics and based on their capital, intcrnediatc 3oods and technolor;y. 36
Thone di[icicnccs in the structure and the pcrfornancc of the agricultural
and nanufacturin::; sectors arc noreover allo\vcd to persist for sonc tir.1c without
beconing a serious problen to the political cconony, precisely because of the
abundance of forcir;n c:;:changc provided

o:r

the nineral industry itself.

Ioport of

food arc readily available to fill in the :;ap between food dcr:iand and local food
supplies, inports of capital cquipr:ient and intcrncdiatc goods arc available to
service the dependent character of the nanufacturin3 sector, and inports of
finished consur:icrs r;oods arc available to r.1cct the dor.icstic dcr.1ands that dor.iestic
nanufacturinr; fails to

□cet.

Hor cover, the boon in inport::i and in public

spendinr:; do r;ive ri::ie to certain investr.1cnt opportunities within which national
capital can find secure, quick and hic;h returns.

These arc the activities of

inport tradin[;, and its ancillary activity, internal transport; the promotion
and construction of office buildings and residential accomodation, public
work contract business, and personal and conncrcial services.

The oost io-

portant of thcnc activities arc those which arc c.entcrcd on physical construction,
as an inspection of the National .Accounts of Venezuela, Chile, Trinidad-Tobago or
Jauaica, o:r a visit to Caracas, Santiazo, Port~of-Spain o:.: Kinz::iton, Hill readily

-48The overall result is that ~ost important structural changes taking
place in association with the growth of the level of foreign exchange and
tax revenue provided by the industry,are those which assume the continued
existence of these flows.

In terms of the country's external accounts, this

is reflected in the continued weight of the mineral export in total exports,
and the rapid growth of imports both of final consumer goods and of intermediate
goods for local assembly.

In terms of the national accounts, it is reflected

in the weight of the mining, Government and service sectors in the Gross Domestic
Product by Industrial Origin. In terms of the demand components, it is
reflected in the importance of exports, foreign investment in the mineral
industry, and Government expenditure on current and capital account.

Long-

term growth is governed by the rate of expansion of the mineral-export industry.
Structural dependence, rather than being reduced, has in an important sense
been intensified by the partial incorporation of the industry into the national
economy Y!!_ the public sector.
So long as output in the mineral-export industry grows steadily and
prices on which taxes are based remain firm, this system is capable of continued
expansion along the lines of what we might call "dependent growth without
development."

There will be high investment rates, and a relatively high rate

of growth of total and average per capita national income, although structural
poverty and unemployment remain widespread.

But as we have seen the mineral

export industry does not expand indefinitely: the very factors which make it
important to the national economy - the high rate of growth of output and
the growth of the tax take - are those which make it necessary for the company
or companies ultimately to shift the location of new capacity elsewhere.

The

-49-

consequent reduction in the rate of growth of output is directly reflected
in the decline in the growth of tax revenue and foreign exchange receipts.

This

puts pressure on the most important propulsive mechanism of the system - the
growth of public spending - and the most important permissive mechanism - the
growth of imports.

Hence the political economy will either have to contain

these mechanisms, or to find ways and means of allowing them

continued operation.

It will not be easy for these mechanisms to be contained, precisely
because they becoine intrinsic parts of the political economy itself.

The momentum

of public spending is difficult to control because of both real and monetary
factors.

The real level of recurrent spending has to rise steadily because of the

recurrent costs of servicing the steadily growing stock of public assets, such
as schools, hospitals, roads and public buildings.

Powerful political pressures

exist for the maintenance and growth of capital spending as well, for neglected
socio-economic and geographic groups, whose expectations have been aroused,
make their demands for their share of Government services.

The growth of

population adds yet another factor which public spending has to account for.
Finally, the steady growth of wage rates consequent on the internal demonstration
effect of the mine workers adds an important inflationary factor to public
spending.

Obviously,a political establishment which exists because of its

ability to accomodate to such demands will find it very difficult to contain them.
Neither will it be easy to contain the growth of imports without severe
effects on the economy and therefore severe costs to the polity.

It is precisely

the growth of imports which permits the propulsive mechanism to operate without
37
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Imports also

sustain the level and growth of output in the fledgeling manufacturing secto~

-50by providing intermediate goods; and sustain the level and growth of
activity in the internal trade and transport sectors.

Hence there is a

limit to the degree to which imports can be restricted without jeopardizing
output, employment and incomes in domestic manufacturing and import-based
services, and internal price stability.
Thus while some degree of internal containment may be attempted, the
Government is likely to seek ways and means of obtaining additional fiscal
receipts in the form of foreign exchange, in order to allow both public spending and imports to continue to grow.

The two principal forms potentially

available are foreign public borrowing and additional taxes on the mineralexport industry.

Ironically, the very existence of the mineral-export industry

makes it easier for the Government to accumulate heavy foreign indebtedness,
since its external credit-worthiness is good.

This is probably one reason why

Governments such as those of Venezuela, Chile and Jamaica, which are relatively
well off in Hinterland America, have experience a rapid growth of their external
public debt in the last two decades.

However this method is at best at

temporary solution: foreign loans are not available indefinitely at a steadily
high rate of growth in the absolute level, and in any case they create obligations
which grow proportionately to their use.

Hence the Government finds itself

with the need to try to .extract even greater surpluses from the mineral-export
industry.
Essentially, this was the position in which Chile found itself at the
beginning of the 1950 decade, and Venezuela at the beginning of the 1960 decade.
Their subsequent experienceSshow that there is a limit to which a Government
already taxing the mineral-export industry relatively heavily (say, at over 50

-51percent of net profits) can further increase its take of profits without
coming into open conflict with the corporate economic system.

For the

attempt to increase revenues leads inevitably to the more basic questions
of control over production, accounting, pricing and marketing, since the
variables determining the very size of the net profits to which the tax rate
is being applied, are to a large extent under the control of the corporation
In the first place, the company starts out with considerable leeway

itself.

over the size of the depreciation, depletion, and amorization allowances
which it deducts from its income in declaring taxable profit.

For example,

whether exploration and development expenditures are capitalized or treated
as operational costs, what rate of depreciation or depletion will be used, whether
and what kind of investment and depletion allowances will apply.

Second, the

company begins with almost total control over the price used to value the
product, which is essentially an intra-firm accounting item used for tax
minimization purposes.

The Government eventually discovers that apparently

minor changes in accounting procedures and prices can make as big a difference
in its tax take as relatively large changes in the percentage rate of tax on
profits.
The inevitable logic of this is that the Government must assert its
right to participate in those decisions which determine its tax take: accounting,
pricing and marketing.

It is not difficult to see that, apart from reducing

profits, such moves go against the grain of the corporate system itself: its
routines,

its reflexes, its administrative structure,

procedures - the rules of the game, as· it were.

its decision-making

While most companies appear

to have accomodated without great difficulty to these encroachments on their
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authority~ pa~t of their response is to utilize alternative supply sources
as a ocans to pressure the governncnts and of obtaining new supplies on rel
atively free terr.is.

The counter-respon::ie of the Governoents is necessarily

to reduce the cor.1pr1nics' area of ::ianeuverability by international collective

bargainin:3, i.e. airnociations of producinr; countries.

This was to a large ex

tent responsible for the leading role played by Venezuela and Chile respectively
in the forr.mtion of the associations of oil and copper-exporting countries,·
It is not difficult to sec that a further logical counter-thrust of
the national cconouic systen is full national ownership and control over the
nineral-c::icport industry.

This dcvelopnent is already l1ell under l1ay in these

two countries, with the forr:iation of the national oil coo.pany in Venezuela
and the "Chilenization 11 arranger:ients for copper r:iade by the Frei Governncnt.
The logic of this analysis is that the rJonentun of nationalization of
pricing, nar:~ctinr;, ownc:rship and dccision-r:ialdng r:iay in fact represent the
dcnand of the nationnl econonic systen to continue along the sane c::pansion
path as before ncrely by brcal::in:3 tf1c constraints on the continued
growth of its fiscal and forci2;n e}:chan3c receipts represented by the
structure and policies of the uultinational corporation.
The diversification of the bases of econonic growth, and the clio.ination
of structural uneo.ployr.ient and of natcrial poverty, would not take place without
conpler.icntary inotitutional chanecs and con.plencntary policies ,-,ith respect to
agriculture, the financial systen, the r:ianufacturing sector and the educational
systen.

llithout such conpler.ientary chan3cs, it is quite easy to envisage an

cconony which renaino structurally dependent on its nationalized r.tlnerale,cport indui::try, in the sense that the structure, .level nnd rate of c;rowth of
national incor;ie arc dependent on the pe:rfor,.1ancc of the industry.

Hhat will
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have changed howeve~ are the institutional ties which made investment, pro

duction, processing and prices in the industry subject to the needs of a
global enterprise.

Which

is to sny that whereas nationalization is not a

sufficient condition -£or the elimination of the structural dependence of the
national economic _system on the industry, it is certair.ly a necessary one.
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